CAS-005 CompTIA SecurityX Certification Exam Questions and Answers

The log shows an AXFR (zone transfer) query, which exposed internal DNS records, aiding lateral movement. Let’s evaluate:

A. Disabling DNS zone transfers:AXFR allows full DNS zone data to be transferred. Disabling it externally prevents attackers from mapping internal networks, directly mitigating this issue per CAS-005’s security operations focus.

B. Restricting to UDP/53:AXFR uses TCP/53, so this wouldn’t stop it.

C. DNSmasking:Obscures records but isn’t a standard term for this fix.

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) preparation is critical to protect data against future quantum computing attacks that could break current cryptographic algorithms (e.g., RSA, ECC). According to the CompTIA SecurityX CAS-005 study guide (Domain 3: Cybersecurity Technology, 3.3), quantum computers with sufficient computational power could perform calculations (e.g., Shor’s algorithm) to decrypt data protected by traditional algorithms. PQC focuses on developing algorithms resistant to such increases in computational resources, ensuring long-term data security.

Option B:Key stretching is a technique to strengthen passwords, not related to PQC.

Option C:PQC algorithms often have higher computational costs, not improved performance.

Option D:Asymmetric encryption is not ideal for large data sets, and PQC is not specifically about this use case.

Option A:This accurately describes PQC’s purpose to safeguard data against quantum-driven decryption.

Adversary emulation simulates specific advanced persistent threat (APT) behaviors and techniques to test an organization’s security posture. In SecurityX CAS-005, this is part of red-teaming and purple-teaming strategies for realistic resilience testing.

Reliability factors (B) relate to operational uptime, not threat simulation.

Honeypots (C) attract attackers but do not directly emulate specific adversaries.

Internal reconnaissance (D) is one phase of an attack simulation, not the full emulation of advanced threat actors.

The question states that security scanning and quality assurance (QA) in the CI/CD pipeline have been completed with no issues, indicating that the code in the test branch is ready for production. According to the CompTIA SecurityX CAS-005 study guide (Domain 2: Security Operations, 2.3), in a secure CI/CD pipeline, once code passes automated security scans, QA, and other checks (e.g., unit testing, peer reviews), the next step is to merge the tested branch into the main branch for deployment to production.

Option B:Threat modeling is typically performed earlier, during design or development, not after passing CI/CD checks.

Option C:Unit testing is part of the CI/CD pipeline and should already be completed.

Option D:Peer reviews are conducted before or during the test phase, not after QAand security scans are clear.

Option A:Merging the test branch to the main branch is the logical next step to prepare for production deployment.

Always-on VPN ensures that devices connect automatically to the corporate network whenever they are online, allowing seamless access to internal resources and enabling authentication against on-premises directory services (such as Active Directory). This supports centralized identity management, GPO enforcement, and compliance requirements.

Options B, C, and D involve local or peripheral resources, which are unaffected by VPN state.

This scenario describes an attack where the attacker mimics the CEO’s voice to deceive the CFO, likely using AI-generated audio. According to the CompTIA SecurityX CAS-005 study guide (Domain 1: Security Strategy and Risk Management, 1.2), a deepfake attack involves using artificial intelligence to create realistic but fake audio, video, or other media to impersonate someone. In this case, the voice similarity suggests a deepfake audio attack, which is a targeted social engineering tactic.

Option A:Smishing involves SMS-based phishing, not voicecalls.

Option C:Automated exploit generation refers to creating software exploits, not impersonation.

Option D:Spear phishing targets specific individuals but typically via email, not voice-based impersonation.

Option B:Deepfake is the most accurate, as it describes AI-driven impersonation of the CEO’s voice.

D. STIX (Structured Threat Information eXpression): STIX is a standardized language for representing threat information in a structured and machine-readable format. It facilitates the sharing ofthreat intelligence by ensuring that data is consistent and can be easily understood by all parties involved.

E. TAXII (Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information): TAXII is a transport mechanism that enables the sharing of cyber threat information over a secure and trusted network. It works in conjunction with STIX to automate the exchange of threat intelligence among organizations.

Other options:

A. CWPP (Cloud Workload Protection Platform): This focuses on securing cloud workloads and is not directly related to threat intelligence sharing.

B. YARA: YARA is used for malware research and identifying patterns in files, but it is not a platform for sharing threat intelligence.

C. ATT&CK: This is a knowledge base of adversary tactics andtechniques but does not facilitate the sharing of threat intelligence data.

F. JTAG: JTAG is a standard for testing and debugging integrated circuits, not related to threat intelligence.

Building playbooks for different scenarios and performing regular table-top exercises directly addresses the issues identified in the lessons-learned review. Here's why:

Lost important information for further analysis: Playbooks outline step-by-step procedures for incident response, ensuring that team members know exactly what to document and how to preserve evidence.

Did not utilize the chain of communication: Playbooks include communication protocols, specifying who to notify and when. Regular table-top exercises reinforce these communication channels, ensuring they are followed during actual incidents.

Did not follow the right steps for a proper response: Playbooks provide a clear sequence of actions to be taken during various types of incidents, helping the team to respond in a structured and effective manner. Regular exercises allow the team to practice these steps, identifying and correcting any deviations from the plan.

Investing in better forensic tools (Option A) or requiring certifications (Option C) are also valuable, but they do not directly address the procedural and communication gaps identified. Publishing and enforcing the incident response policy (Option D) is important but not as practical and hands-on as playbooks and exercises in ensuring the team is prepared.

To protect company information on stolen mobile devices, implementingremote wipe proceduresensures data can be erased if a device is suspected lost or stolen.Biometric access controlwith enforced timeouts further secures the device, requiring biometric authentication periodically, thus limiting unauthorized access even if the device is stolen. Geofencing and certificates provide additional security layers but are less immediate protections against information exposure after theft. Application control and side-loading prevention are important for malware threats but less so for stolen device scenarios.

The best option is adversary emulation. Adversary emulation involves simulating real-world attacker Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) based on frameworks like MITRE ATT&CK. Unlike penetration tests, which primarily focus on identifying exploitable vulnerabilities, adversary emulation specifically tests the effectiveness of detection and response capabilities against known adversarial behaviors.

Option A (penetration testing) provides value but may not align test cases with SIEM detection rules. Option C (vulnerability assessment) identifies weaknesses but does not test detection rules. Option D (threat hunting) is proactive analysis but does not validate existing SIEM rule coverage in a structured manner. Option E (threat feeds) enrich SIEM data but do not test its efficacy.

CAS-005 identifies adversary emulation as a key strategy for validating detection and response coverage. It provides measurable results about what alerts are triggered and where detection gaps exist, enabling organizations to tune SIEM rules for improved efficacy.

A Configuration Management Database (CMDB) provides the best foundation for identifying which specific assets are affected by a given vulnerability. A CMDB maintains detailed information about the IT environment, including hardware, software, configurations, and relationships between assets. This comprehensive view allows organizations to quickly identify and address vulnerabilities affecting specific assets.

Removing unnecessary services from existing endpoints reduces the attack surface by minimizing the number of potential vulnerabilities attackers could exploit. This is a cost-effective method to harden devices without requiring new purchases, aligning perfectly with a purchasing freeze. Deploying new EDR solutions or disposing of devices would likely conflict with the resource freeze, and reimaging systems does not address minimizing services proactively.

SecurityX CAS-005 exam content emphasizes integrating security into the SDLC and using automated tools to identify vulnerabilities early.

Software dependency management solutions track and analyze libraries and components for known vulnerabilities before deployment, using vulnerability databases such as NVD or OSS Index.

IAST scanning still requires the application to be running and may detect issues later.

WAF policies help block attacks in production but do not prevent vulnerable code from being deployed.

SIEM monitoring is reactive and identifies issues after they occur.By detecting vulnerable dependencies early, software dependency management solutions prevent late-stage deployment delays and reduce security risk.

SecurityX CAS-005 emphasizes automation with validation in security operations. Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR) platforms can integrate with Threat Intelligence Platforms (TIPs) to verify threat indicators before triggering automated endpoint isolation through EDR APIs. This approach reduces the spread of malware while minimizing the chance of isolating clean systems due to false positives.

Isolating endpoints on any alert (B) is high-risk and can disrupt business operations.

Manual review (C) is too slow for fast-moving threats.

Suppressing alerts (D) risks missing critical events entirely.

Homomorphic encryption allows computations to be performed on encrypted data without decrypting it, providing strong privacy guarantees. However, the adoption of homomorphic encryption is challenging due to several factors:

A. Incomplete mathematical primitives: This is not the primary barrier as the theoretical foundations of homomorphic encryption are well-developed.

B. No use cases to drive adoption: There are several compelling use cases for homomorphic encryption, especially in privacy-sensitive fields like healthcare and finance.

C. Quantum computers not yet capable: Quantum computing is not directly related to the challenges of adopting homomorphic encryption.

D. Insufficient coprocessor support: The computational overhead of homomorphic encryption is significant, requiring substantial processing power. Current general-purpose processors are not optimized for the intensive computations required by homomorphic encryption, limiting its practical deployment. Specialized hardware or coprocessors designed to handle these computations more efficiently are not yet widely available.

Integrating IDS, firewall, and DLP to reduce response time requires orchestration and automation. Let’s evaluate:

A. SOAR(Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response):SOAR integrates security tools, automates workflows, and speeds up incident response. It’s the best fit for this scenario, as CAS-005 highlights SOAR for operational efficiency.

B. CWPP (CloudWorkload Protection Platform):Focused on securing cloud workloads, not integrating on-premises tools.

C. XCCDF (Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format):A standard for compliance checklists, not a tool for integration or response.

Code-signing within theCI/CD pipelineensures that only verified and signed code is deployed, mitigating the risk of supply chain attacks. Updating Python withaptitudeand updating modules withpipensures vulnerabilities are patched. Deploying the solution to production after testing maintains application availability while securing the development lifecycle.

Branch protection (B)applies only to version-controlled environments, which is not the case here.

NFS network share (C)does not address the deprecated Python vulnerability.

Version designation (D)does not eliminate security risks from outdated dependencies.

Risk appetite is the amount of risk an organization is willing to accept to achieve its objectives. When operating with a constrained budget, understanding the organization's risk appetite is crucial because:

It helps prioritize security investments based on the level of risk the organization is willing to tolerate.

High-impact, low-likelihood events may be deemed acceptable if they fall within the organization's risk appetite, allowing for budget allocation to other critical areas.

Properly understanding and defining risk appetite ensures that limited resources are used effectively to manage risks that align with the organization's strategic goals.

The best step is to query user behavior analytics (UBA) data. SIEM alerts provide potential security events, but without additional context, they may lead to false positives. UBA solutions detect anomalies by comparing user activity against baselines of normal behavior, highlighting unusual login patterns, lateral movement, or privilege escalation.

Option A (password manager logs) focuses only on credential use and lacks behavioral insight. Option B (dark web monitoring) helps identify compromised accounts but does not investigate the internal incident. Option C (audit logs for privileged actions) is useful but narrow in scope—it only covers administrator accounts.

By correlating SIEM data with UBA, the engineer can validate whether the flagged activity indicates real malicious behavior or benign anomalies. CAS-005 emphasizes advanced analytics integration (UEBA/UBA) to strengthen investigation and reduce false positives, making Option D the most effective choice.

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) supports change management by securing messages (e.g., approvals, updates).Non-repudiation, provided via digital signatures, ensures a sender cannot deny sending a message, critical for auditability in change processes.

Option A:Correct—PKI’s digital signatures ensure non-repudiation.

Option B:Confidentiality (via encryption) is a PKI feature but less tied to change management’s focus on accountability.

Option C:Delivery receipts are not aPKI function; they’re protocol-specific (e.g., SMTP).

Option D:Attestation relates to verifying attributes, not a direct PKI message capability.

Addressing misconfigurations and vulnerabilities in third-party hardware requires a comprehensive approach to manage risks throughout the supply chain. Implementing a proper supply chain risk management (SCRM) program is the most effective solution as it encompasses the following:

Holistic Approach: SCRM considers the entire lifecycle ofthe product, from initial design through to delivery and deployment. This ensures that risks are identified and managed at every stage.

Vendor Management: It includes thorough vetting of suppliers and ongoing assessments of their security practices, which can identify and mitigate vulnerabilities early.

Regular Audits and Assessments: A robust SCRM program involves regular audits and assessments, both internally and with suppliers, to ensure compliance with security standards and best practices.

Collaboration and Communication: Ensures that there is effective communication and collaboration between the company and its suppliers, leading to faster identification and resolution of issues.

Other options, while beneficial, do not provide the same comprehensive risk management:

A. Performing vulnerability tests on each device delivered by the providers: While useful, this is reactive and only addresses issues after they have been delivered.

B. Performing regular red-team exercises on the vendor production line: This can identify vulnerabilities but is not as comprehensive as a full SCRM program.

C. Implementing a monitoring process for the integration between the application and the vendor appliance: This is important but only covers the integration phase, not the entire supply chain.

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The vulnerability lies in line [10], where the function strcpy(transmit, input) is used. The strcpy function does not perform boundary checking when copying strings. Since input is defined with a size of 256 characters and transmit only has 20 characters allocated, the strcpy operation will cause a buffer overflow when the contents of input exceed the allocated size of transmit. This creates a significant security vulnerability, as attackers can overwrite adjacent memory, potentially injecting malicious code or altering program execution.

Lines [02], [04], [07], and [08] are not inherently vulnerable by themselves. Line [04] defines the oversized input, but the vulnerability only materializes when combined with the unsafe copy in line [10]. Secure coding practices recommend using safer alternatives like strncpy, which includes a length parameter, or implementing runtime checks to ensure the destination buffer size is not exceeded.

Thus, the vulnerable line that must be changed is line [10], where strcpy is used.

Model poisoning occurs when an attacker manipulates the training data or the training process of an AI model so that its predictions are deliberately inaccurate or biased. In the SecurityX CAS-005 objectives, this is part of understanding emerging technology threats, specifically AI/ML vulnerabilities. This differs from:

Social engineering, which manipulates humans rather than AI models.

Output handling, which deals with how outputs are processed but doesn’t cause inaccuracy at the model level.

Prompt injections, which manipulate the model at query time, not during training.Because model poisoning directly corrupts the AI model itself, it is the clearest reason AI outputs could be inaccurate.

A.Creating a secondary, immutable storage array and updating it with live data on a continuous basis: An immutable storage array ensures that data, once written, cannot be altered or deleted. This greatly reduces the risk of backup compromise and provides resilience against ransomware attacks, as the ransomware cannot modify or delete the backup data. Maintaining multiple copies of production data with an immutable storage solution ensures data integrity and compliance with the requirement for multiple copies.

Other options:

B. Utilizing two connected storage arrays and ensuring the arrays constantly sync: While this ensures data redundancy, it does not provide protection against ransomware attacks, as both arrays could be compromised simultaneously.

C. Enabling remote journaling on the databases: This ensures real-time transaction mirroring but does not address the requirement for reducing the risk of backup compromise or resilience to ransomware.

D. Setting up anti-tampering on the databases: While this helps ensure data integrity, it does not provide a comprehensive backup solution that meets all the specified requirements.

Reviewing data sovereignty laws in countries where the organization has no presence is likely due to concerns about regulatory enforcement. Data sovereignty laws dictate how data can be stored, processed, and transferred across borders. Understanding these laws is crucial for compliance, especially if the organization handles data that may be subject to foreign regulations.

A. The organization is performing due diligence of potential tax issues: This is less likely as tax issues are generally not directly related to data sovereignty laws.

B. The organization has been subject to legal proceedings in countries where it has a presence: While possible, this does not explain the focus on countries where the organization has no presence.

C. The organization is concerned with new regulatory enforcement in other countries: This is the most likely reason. New regulations could impact the organization’s operations, especially if they involve data transfers or processing data from these countries.

D. The organization has suffered brand reputation damage from incorrect media coverage: This is less relevant to the need for reviewing data sovereignty laws.

B. Pre-commit code linting: Linting tools analyze code for syntax errors andadherence to coding standards before the code is committed to the repository. This helps catch minor code issues early in the development process, reducing the likelihood of deployment failures.

D. Automated regression testing: Automated regression tests ensure that new code changes do not introduce bugs or regressions into the existing codebase. By running these tests automatically during the deployment process, developers can catch issues early and ensure the stability of the development environment.

Other options:

A. Software composition analysis: This helps identify vulnerabilities in third-party components but does not directly address code quality or deployment failures.

C. Repository branch protection: While this can help manage the code submission process, it does not directly prevent deployment failures caused by code issues or security check failures.

E. Code submit authorization workflow: This manages who can submit code but does not address the quality of the code being submitted.

F. Pipeline compliance scanning: This checks for compliance with security policies but does not address syntax or regression issues.

For a disaster recovery (DR) plan requiring immediate data availability, the first step is understanding what needs to be protected and recovered. Identifying critical business processes and their associated software and hardware requirements establishes the foundation for the DR plan. This ensures that backups and recovery mechanisms align with business priorities, meeting the "moment's notice" requirement.

Option A:A change management plan is important for system consistency but doesn’t directly address immediate data availability in a DR context.

Option B:Hiring staff supports execution but doesn’t define what needs to be recovered or how. It’s a later step.

Option C:A warm site (a partially operational backup site) is a good DR solution, but designing it comes after identifying critical processes and resources.

Option D:This is the first step in any DR planning process—knowing what’s critical ensures the plan meets availability goals efficiently.

The ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge) framework is the best tool for a security analyst to use for threat modeling when looking for gaps in detection capabilities based on Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) that may target the industry. Here’s why:

Comprehensive Framework: ATT&CK provides a detailed and structured repository of known adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations. It helps organizations understand how attackers operate and what techniques they might use.

Gap Analysis: By mapping existing security controls against the ATT&CK matrix, analysts can identify which tactics and techniques are not adequately covered by current detection and mitigation measures.

Industry Relevance: The ATT&CK framework is continuously updated with the latest threat intelligence, making it highly relevant for industries facing APT threats. It provides insights into specific APT groups and their preferred methods of attack.

To improve the vulnerability management process in an environment where new devices/IPs are added and dropped regularly, the company should perform regular discovery scanning throughout the IT landscape using the vulnerability management tool. Here’s why:

Accurate Asset Inventory: Regular discovery scans help maintain an up-to-date inventory of all assets, ensuring that the vulnerability management process includes all relevant devices and IPs.

Consistency in Reporting: By continuously discovering and scanning new and existing assets, the company can generate consistent and comprehensive vulnerability reports that reflect the current state of the network.

Proactive Management: Regular scans enable the organization to proactively identify and address vulnerabilities on new and existing assets, reducing the window of exposure to potential threats.

The first action is to implement continuous and context-based authentication and authorization (A). Traditional authentication validates users only at login, which creates gaps during active sessions. Continuous authentication ensures validation throughout the data access workflow, incorporating contextual factors like device state, geolocation, and behavioral analysis. This directly aligns with audit findings requiring protection by role, identity validation, and action tracking.

Option B improves onboarding and monitoring but does not enforce continuous access control. Option C improves identity federation but does not provide session-by-session validation. Option D secures APIs but is too narrow for organization-wide identity workflows.

CAS-005 stresses Zero Trust and context-aware IAM, making continuous authentication and authorization the top priority.

Input sanitation is a critical process in cybersecurity that involvesvalidating and cleaning data provided by users to prevent malicious inputs from causing harm. In the context of AI concerns:

A. Model inversion involves an attacker inferring sensitive data from model outputs, typically requiring sophisticated methods beyond just manipulating input data.

B. Prompt Injection is a form of attack where an adversary provides malicious input to manipulate the behavior of AI models, particularly those dealing with natural language processing (NLP). Input sanitation directly addresses this by ensuring that inputs are cleaned and validated to remove potentially harmful commands or instructions that could alter the AI's behavior.

C. Data poisoning involves injecting malicious data into the training set to compromise the model. While input sanitation can help by filtering out bad data, data poisoning is typically addressed through robust data validation and monitoring during the model training phase, rather than real-time input sanitation.

D. Non-explainable model refers to the lack of transparency in how AI models make decisions. This concern is not addressed by input sanitation, as it relates more to model design and interpretability techniques.

Input sanitation is most relevant and effective for preventing Prompt Injection attacks, where the integrity of user inputs directly impacts the performance and security of AI models.

Understanding Business Impact Analysis (BIA):

ABIA assesses the effects of disruptionsto an organization's operations.

It helpsprioritize resourcesbased on the potential impact ofdowntime, compliance issues, and critical processes.

Why Options B, C, and F are Correct:

B (Applicable contract obligations)→ Many companies havelegal and compliance obligationsregarding downtime, availability, and SLAs. This information helps determine whatrisk levelsare acceptable.

C (Costs associated with downtime)→ BIA quantifies the financial impact of system failures. Knowinglost revenue, regulatory fines, and recovery costshelps in planning.

F (Critical processes)→ Identifyingcore business processesallows an organization toprioritize recoveryeffortsandmaintain operational continuity.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

A (Inventory details)→ While useful for asset management, it doesnot directly impact business continuity planning.

D (Network diagrams)→ These help in security architecture but arenot directly related to the financial/business impact analysis.

E (Contingency plans)→ BIA isperformed before contingency planningto identifywhat needs protection.

Vendor lock-in occurs when a client is overly dependent on a vendor, limiting flexibility. Risks include:

Option B:Vendors changing offerings (e.g., features, pricing) can disrupt the client, a key lock-in risk.

Option D:Decreased quality of service may result from reliance on a single vendor without alternatives.

Option A:Seamless data movement is a benefit, not a risk.

Option C:Sufficient service is neutral or positive, not a risk.

Option E:Multicloud is hindered by lock-in, not a risk of it.

Option F:Increased interoperability contradicts lock-in’s limitations.

The log-in activity indicates a security threat, particularly involving the ADMIN account with a high-risk failure status. This suggests that the account may be targeted by malicious activities such as credential stuffing or brute force attacks.

Updating log configuration settings (A) may help in better logging future activities but does not address the immediate threat.

Changing the admin account password (B) is a good practice but may not fully mitigate the ongoing threat if the account has already been compromised.

Blocking employees (C) from logging into non-business applications might help in reducing attack surfaces but doesn't directly address the compromised account issue.

Implementing automation to disable accounts associated with high-risk activities ensures an immediate response to the detected threat, preventing further unauthorized access and allowing time for thorough investigation and remediation.

To reduce the number of failed patch deployments, the systems administrator should implement a robust change management process. Change management ensures that all modifications to systems or applications are planned, tested, and approved before deployment. This systematic approach reduces the risk of unplanned changes that can cause patch failures and ensures that patches are deployed in a controlled and predictable manner.

Understanding the Ransomware Issue:

The key issue here is thatbackups were not recoverable within the required RPO timeframe.

This means the organizationdid not properly testitsbackup and disaster recovery (DR) processes.

To prevent this from happening again, regular disaster recovery testing is essential.

Why Option C is Correct:

Disaster recovery testing ensures that backups are functionaland can meetbusiness continuity needs.

Frequent DR testingallows organizations to identify and fixgaps in recovery strategies.

Regular testing ensuresthat recoverymeets the RPO & RTO (Recovery Time Objective) requirements.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

A (Encrypt & label backup tapes):While encryption is important, it does not address thefailure to meet RPO requirements.

B (Reverting to manual business processes):While amanual continuity planis good for resilience, it doesnot resolve the backup and recovery failure.

D (Tabletop exercise & RACI matrix):Atabletop exerciseis a planning activity, butit does not involve actual recovery testing.

When dealing with false positives and false negatives reported by a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system, the goal is to enhance the accuracy of the alerts and ensure that actual threats are identified correctly. The following sources of information best support the analysis process:

A. Third-party reports and logs: Utilizing external sources of information such as threat intelligence reports, vendor logs, and other third-party data can provide a broader perspective on potential threats. These sources often contain valuable insights and context that can help correlate events more accurately, reducing the likelihood of false positives and false negatives.

B. Trends: Analyzing trends over time can help inunderstanding patterns and anomalies in the data. By observing trends, the security team can distinguish between normal and abnormal behavior, which aids in fine-tuning the SIEM configurations to better detect true positives and reduce false alerts.

Other options such as dashboards, alert failures, network traffic summaries, and manual review processes are also useful but are more operational rather than foundational for understanding the root causes of reporting errors in SIEM configurations.

The organization is most concerned about Generative AI improving phishing and social engineering attacks. Tools like ChatGPT can generate highly convincing phishing emails, fake websites, and human-like interactions that bypass traditional detection methods. Employees who were trained to spot poor grammar or obvious scams may now struggle to detect AI-crafted exploits.

Option A relates to compliance but not AI-driven threats. Option B (overreliance on AI bots) is operational risk, not phishing. Option D (differential analysis) applies to AI privacy issues, not phishing.

CAS-005 emphasizes adapting training to emerging threats, including AI-enabled social engineering. This ensures users remain resilient against modern attacks, making C the correct answer.

The SIEM report shows that some devices, such as VM003 (Critical server) and NET003 (IPS), are DOWN and therefore not reporting logs. In security monitoring, the absence of log data from critical systems creates dangerous blind spots. If logs are missing, attacks can proceed undetected, or investigations may lack the data needed for incident response.

The most effective action is to perform a non-reporting device assessment (C). This means identifying and correcting issues where devices fail to send logs, whether due to outages, misconfigurations, or integration gaps. Ensuring all critical devices, especially servers and intrusion prevention systems, consistently send logs to the SIEM strengthens overall visibility and monitoring posture.

Option A (time calibration) is important for correlation accuracy but does not address missing log feeds. Option B (centralized use case library) enhances detection but only works if the SIEM is receiving complete data. Option D (resiliency plan) helps protect log retention but is irrelevant if logs are never received in the first place.

Therefore, fixing non-reporting log sources is the highest priority to improve monitoring effectiveness.

The SIEM already contains multiple events that, if correlated, would have indicated an active attack sequence on VM001—such as denied connections, IPS alerts, malware detection, and then an allowed connection. CAS-005 Security Operations objectives emphasize log correlation as a way to enhance detection by linking related events across different time stamps and data sources into a single, higher-confidence alert.

Option A (adding EDR logs) could add visibility but does not address the need to connect existing events for earlier detection.

Option C (improving parsing) ensures readability but does not create actionable alerts.

Option D (creating a new malware detection rule) is redundant since malware detection already appeared in logs; the issue was the lack of correlation to act on it in time.

By correlating IDS, IPS, firewall, and malware detection logs, the SIEM can raise a higher-priority alert before the attack is completed.

The best solution is to use a non-persistent virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) with thin clients (B). Thin clients are inexpensive, easy to replace, and resilient in harsh environments where traditional endpoints may be damaged. With non-persistent VDI, employee desktops are virtualized and reset to a clean state after logout, reducing risks from turnover, malware persistence, or user misconfiguration. Centralized management ensures consistent patching and security updates while minimizing downtime, since damaged thin clients can be swapped quickly with minimal disruption.

Option A (environmental controls) may reduce equipment damage but does not address turnover or regulatory retention requirements. Option C (redundant servers and journaling) improves data integrity but does not solve endpoint-related risks or staffing issues. Option D (maintaining spare endpoints) mitigates hardware failures but still relies on managing and configuring full systems, which is inefficient for high-turnover environments.

CAS-005 emphasizes virtualization and centralization strategies in environments where operational resilience, rapid recovery, and compliance are critical. Non-persistent VDI with thin clients provides the most comprehensive solution here.

The output indicates that the software tool contains hard-coded credentials, which attackers can exploit to bypass user access controls and load the database. The mostlikely recommendation is to remove hard-coded credentials from the source code. Here’s why:

Security Best Practices: Hard-coded credentials are a significant security risk because they can be easily discovered through reverse engineering or simple inspection of the code. Removing them reduces the risk of unauthorized access.

Credential Management: Credentials should be managed securely using environment variables, secure vaults, or configuration management tools that provide encryption and access controls.

Mitigation of Exploits: By eliminating hard-coded credentials, the organization can prevent attackers from easily bypassing authentication mechanisms and gaining unauthorized access to sensitive systems.

The security engineer should modify the following to fix the email migration issues:

Email CNAME Record: The email CNAME record must be changed to a type A record pointing to 192.168.1.10. This is because CNAME records should not be used where an IP address (A record) is required. Changing it to an A record ensures direct pointing to the correct IP.

TXT Record for DMARC: The TXT record must be changed to "v=dmarc ip4:192.168.1.10 include

com -all". This ensures proper configuration of DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance) to include the correct IP address and the email service provider domain.

DMARC: Ensuring the DMARC record is correctly set up helps in preventing email spoofing and phishing, aligning with email security best practices.

A centralized Software Bill of Materials (SBoM) is the best solution for identifying vulnerabilities in container images in aprivate repository. An SBoM provides a comprehensive inventory of all components, dependencies, and their versions within a container image, facilitating quick evaluation and response to vulnerabilities.

Why Centralized SBoM?

Comprehensive Inventory: An SBoM lists all software components, including their versions and dependencies, allowing for thorough vulnerability assessments.

Quick Identification: Centralizing SBoM data enables rapid identification of affected containers when a vulnerability is disclosed.

Automation: SBoMs can be integrated into automated tools for continuous monitoring and alerting of vulnerabilities.

Regulatory Compliance: Helps in meeting compliance requirements by providing a clear and auditable record of all software components used.

Other options, while useful, do not provide the same level of comprehensive and efficient vulnerability management:

A. SAST scan reports: Focuses on static analysis of code but may not cover all components in container images.

C. CIS benchmark compliance reports: Ensures compliance with security benchmarks but does not provide detailed component inventory.

D. Credentialed vulnerability scan: Useful for in-depth scans but may not be as efficient for quick vulnerability evaluation.

The logs indicate unauthorized access from104.18.16.29, an external IP, to the building camera’s administrative console during off-hours.Restricting access only to approved IPsensures that only authorized personnel can remotely control the cameras, reducing the risk of unauthorized access and manipulation.

Implementing WAF protection (A)secures against web application attacks but does not restrict unauthorized administrative access.

Upgrading the firmware (B)is good security hygiene but does not immediately mitigate the active threat.

Blocking IP 104.18.16.29 (D)is a temporary measure, as an attacker can switch to another IP. A better long-term solution is whitelisting trusted IPs.

Limiting the platform's abilities to only non-sensitive functions helps to mitigate risks associated with AI operations. By ensuring that the AI-enabled digital worker is only allowed to perform tasks that do not involve sensitive or critical data, the organization reduces the potential impact of any security breaches or misuse.

Enhancing the training model's effectiveness (Option B) is important but does not directly address security guardrails. Granting the system the ability to self-govern (Option C) could increase risk as it may act beyond the organization's control. Requiring end-user acknowledgement of organizational policies (Option D) is a good practice but does not implement technical guardrails to secure the AI environment.

Device attestationensures that only corporate-approved devices can perform privileged actions in SaaS applications.Continuous authorizationmonitors ongoing device compliance, dynamically adjusting permissions based onsecurity posture.

Blocking connections (A)is too restrictive and does not accommodate BYOD.

Machine certificates (B)help with authentication but do not provide continuous security assessment.

MDM policies (D)secure mobile devices but do not apply real-time access controls for SaaS applications.

The most secure way to prevent inadvertent data disclosure when encrypted SSDs are reused is to securely delete the encryption keys used by the SSD. Without the encryption keys, the data on the SSD remains encrypted and is effectively unreadable, rendering any residual data useless. This method is more reliable and efficient than overwriting data multiple times or using other physical destruction methods.

The table indicates varying load times for users accessing the website from different geographic locations. Customers from Australia and India are experiencingsignificantly higher load times compared to those from the United States. This suggests that latency and geographical distance are affecting the website's performance.

A. IDS (Intrusion Detection System): While an IDS is useful for detecting malicious activities, it does not address performance issues related to latency and geographical distribution of content.

B. CDN (Content Delivery Network): A CDN stores copies of the website's content in multiple geographic locations. By serving content from the nearest server to the user, a CDN can significantly reduce load times and improve user experience globally.

C. WAF (Web Application Firewall): A WAF protects web applications by filtering and monitoring HTTP traffic but does not improve performance related to geographical latency.

D. NAC (Network Access Control): NAC solutions control access to network resources but are not designed to address web performance issues.

Implementing a CDN is the best solution to resolve the performance issues observed in the log output.

Qualitative risk assessment is used when quantitative data (monetary loss, exact downtime cost, RTO) is unavailable or unreliable. The SecurityX CAS-005 GRC objectives note that qualitative methods rely on expert judgment, likelihood scales, and impact ratings rather than financial calculations. In this case, insufficient metrics rule out quantitative analysis.

Option A (work experience) is irrelevant to the choice of assessment type.

Option C (risk register) supports tracking, not selecting the assessment method.

Option D describes a quantitative goal, which is not possible with the given lack of metrics.

The best option is Mandatory Access Control (MAC). In MAC, access decisions are centrally controlled by the system or administrators, not by individual users. This ensures that healthcare staff who enter patient information cannot grant access to others, thereby preventing accidental or malicious disclosure. MAC enforces strict policies based on data sensitivity and user clearance, which aligns with compliance requirements like HIPAA.

Option A (rule-based) defines access through specific rules but is not as rigidly enforced as MAC. Option B (attribute-based) is flexible but could still allow dynamic grants of access. Option D (discretionary) explicitly allows users to assign access rights, which is exactly what must be avoided in this scenario.

CAS-005 stresses using centralized, non-discretionary controls when protecting sensitive medical data, making MAC the correct choice for hospitals.

The event timeline indicates a sequence where a file (hr-reporting.docx) was saved, scanned, executed, and eventually found to contain malware. The critical issue here is that the malware scan completed after the file was already executed. This suggests a Time-Of-Check to Time-Of-Use (TOCTOU) vulnerability, where the state of the file changed between the time it was checked and the time it was used.

The error message"NET::ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM" indicates that the web browser is rejecting the certificate because it uses a weak signature algorithm. This commonly happens with self-signed certificates, which often use outdated or insecure algorithms.

Why Discontinue Self-Signed Certificates?

Security Compliance: Modern browsers enforce strict security standards and may reject certificates that do not comply with these standards.

Trusted Certificates: Using certificates from a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) ensures compliance with security standards and is less likely to be flagged as insecure.

Weak Signature Algorithm: Self-signed certificates might use weak algorithms like MD5 or SHA-1, which are considered insecure.

Other options do not address the specific cause of the certificate error:

A. Rewriting legacy web functions: Does not address the certificate issue.

B. Disabling deprecated ciphers: Useful for improving security but not related to the certificate error.

C. Blocking non-essential ports: This is unrelated to the issue of certificate validation.

Tokenization replaces sensitive data elements with non-sensitive equivalents, called tokens, that can be used within the internal tests. The original data is stored securely and can be retrieved if necessary. This approach allows the software development team to work with data that appears realistic and valid without exposing the actual sensitive information.

Configuring data hashing (Option A) is not suitable for test data as ittransforms the data into a fixed-length value that is not usable in the same way as the original data. Replacing data with null records (Option C) is not useful as it does not provide valid data for testing. Data obfuscation (Option D) could be an alternative but might not meet the regulatory requirements as effectively as tokenization.

Tokenizationreplaces sensitive data (e.g., PII) with non-sensitive placeholders while maintaining format consistency, ensuring compliancewithout disrupting testing. This method is commonly used forPCI-DSS and GDPR compliancewhile preserving data structure for functional tests.

Encryption (A)secures data but does not remove sensitivity or solve testing concerns.

Truncation (B)removes portions of data but may impact testing if format requirements are strict.

Synthetic data (C)can be useful but may not always match real-world scenarios perfectly for testing purposes.

Homomorphic encryptionallows computations to be performed directly on encrypted data without decrypting it first. This technology is particularly useful for securely transmitting confidential data to a cloud service provider (CSP) and allowing the CSP to process the data without having any visibility into its content. This maintains data confidentiality even during processing. It is not about securing data at rest and in transit or simply storing data across nodes.

When the cost to mitigate certain risks is higher than the asset values, the best approach is to purchase insurance. Thismethod allows the company to transfer the risk to an insurance provider, ensuring that financial losses are covered in the event of an incident. This approach is cost-effective and ensures that risks are prioritized appropriately without overspending on mitigation efforts.

Segmentationis the best option to ensure the security of legacy badge readers that cannot be upgraded. Segmentation isolates the legacy devices on a separate network segment to minimize their exposure to potential threats. This approach reduces the attack surface by preventing unauthorized access from other parts of the network while still allowing necessary connectivity to the enterprise resource planning (ERP) system.

Vulnerability scans (B)are useful for identifying weaknesses but do not actively protect the badge readers.

Anti-malware (C)is ineffective since the badge readers use a legacy platform that likely does not support modern endpoint protection solutions.

Whencreating a threat model to identify vulnerabilities in an organization's infrastructure, prioritizing external-facing infrastructure with known exploited vulnerabilities is critical. Here’s why:

Exposure to Attack: External-facinginfrastructure is directly exposed to the internet, making it a primary target for attackers. Any vulnerabilities in this layer pose an immediate risk to the organization's security.

Known Exploited Vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities that are already known and exploited in the wild are of higher concern because they are actively being used by attackers. Addressing these vulnerabilities reduces the risk of exploitation significantly.

Risk Mitigation: By prioritizing external-facing infrastructure with known exploited vulnerabilities, the organization can mitigate the most immediate and impactful threats, thereby improving overall security posture.

When differentiating between valid and invalid findings from vulnerability scans, the systemsadministrator should verify that the scanning credentials are properly configured. Valid credentials ensure that the scanner can authenticate and access the systems being evaluated, providing accurate and comprehensive results. Without proper credentials, scans may miss vulnerabilities or generate false positives, making it difficult to prioritize and address the findings effectively.

The best solution is Conditional Access (D). Conditional access policies enforce access requirements based on contextual signals such as device compliance, user identity, location, or risk profile. In this case, the administrator can configure conditional access to ensure that only managed, corporate-approved devices are allowed to access confidential data. If an employee attempts to use a personal laptop, the access request will be blocked or redirected to a secure process (e.g., virtual desktop).

Option A (OCSP stapling) relates to certificate revocation checking and does not control device access. Option B (CASB) provides cloud access visibility and control but is broader and less precise than enforcing direct device-level conditional policies. Option C (SOAR) orchestrates responses but is not primarily designed for access enforcement. Option E (package monitoring) detects software changes but does not prevent unauthorized device usage.

Conditional access is a core principle in Zero Trust and modern IAM, making it the best solution for ensuring that sensitive data can only be accessed from trusted devices.

User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) is the best solution to help the company overcome challenges associated with suspicious activity that cannot be categorized by traditional detection tools. UEBA uses advanced analytics to establish baselines of normal behavior for users and entities within the network. It then identifies deviations from these baselines, which may indicate malicious activity. This approach is particularly effective for detecting unknown threats and sophisticated attacks that do not match known indicators of compromise (IoCs).

The issue is tracing the original source of requests in a tiered architecture with a load balancer. The web server logs show internal IPs (192.168.1.10), not the external client IPs, because the load balancer forwards requests without preserving the source. Enabling theX-Forwarded-Forheader on the load balancer adds the client’s original IP to the HTTP request headers, allowing downstream servers to log it. This ensures traceability without altering the architecture significantly.

Option A:Correct—X-Forwarded-For is the standard solution for preserving client IPs through load balancers.

Option B:A Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) detects anomalies but doesn’t address IP traceability.

Option C:A trusted CA certificate fixes the self-signed warning but is unrelated to source tracking.

Option D:Stored procedures improve database security but don’t help with IP logging.

Option E:Storing $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] captures the loadbalancer’s IP, not the client’s, unless X-Forwarded-For is enabled.

This scenario clearly describes asupply chain attack, where the compromise occurs at the vendor or manufacturing stage before the product reaches the customer. The attack impacts many downstream organizations and sectors. SDLC attacks are focused on software development life cycles, side-loading involves unauthorized app installations, and remote code signing focuses on authenticating remote software, none of which fully encapsulate the situation described.

The routing entry 0.0.0.0/0 forces all traffic from remote clients—including traffic destined for the public internet—through the VPN tunnel. This is called full-tunnel VPN routing. While it ensures strong security by forcing all traffic to pass through corporate controls, it can also overload VPN gateways and cause slow access to both internal and external applications, as seen in this scenario.

The correct fix is to enable split tunneling (B). Split tunneling allows only corporate traffic (e.g., private IP ranges or internal applications) to flow through the VPN, while internet-bound traffic routes directly to the internet. This reduces congestion on VPN concentrators, improves performance for remote users, and ensures efficient use of bandwidth.

Moving servers to a screened subnet (A) relates to internal segmentation but does not fix the VPN bottleneck. NAC (C) enforces device compliance but does not address routing inefficiencies. DNS over HTTPS (D) secures name resolution but is unrelated to network congestion.

Thus, enabling split tunneling balances security and performance for remote workers.

To reduce the risk of unauthorized BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) usage, the organization should implement Conditional Access and Network Access Control (NAC).

Why Conditional Access and NAC?

Conditional Access:

User-to-Device Binding: Conditional access policies can enforce that only registered and compliant devices are allowed to access corporate resources.

Context-Aware Security: Enforces access controls based on the context of the access attempt, such as user identity, device compliance, location, and more.

Network Access Control (NAC):

DeviceConfiguration Requirements: NAC ensures that only devices meeting specific security configurations are allowed to connect to the network.

Access Control: Provides granular control over network access, ensuring that BYOD devices comply with security policies before gaining access.

Other options, while useful, do not address the specific need to control and secure BYOD devices effectively:

A. Cloud IAM to enforce token-based MFA: Enhances authentication security but does not control device compliance.

D. PAM to enforce local password policies: Focuses on privileged account management, not BYOD control.

E. SD-WAN to enforce web content filtering: Enhances network performance and security but does not enforce BYOD device compliance.

F. DLP to enforce data protection capabilities: Protects data but does not control BYOD device access and compliance.

Static Application Security Testing (SAST) involves analyzing source code or compiled code for security vulnerabilities without executing the program. This method is well-suited for identifying syntax errors, coding standards violations, and potential security issues early in the development lifecycle.

A. Static application security testing (SAST): SAST tools analyze the source code to detect syntax errors, vulnerabilities, and other issues before the code is run. This is the most relevant task for the DevSecOps team to identify syntax errors and improve code quality.

B. Software composition analysis: This focuses on identifying vulnerabilities in open-source components and libraries used in the application but does not address syntax errors directly.

C. Runtime application self-protection (RASP): RASP involves monitoring and protecting applications during runtime, which does not help in identifying syntax errors during the development phase.

D. Web application vulnerability scanning: This involves scanning the running application for vulnerabilities but does not address syntax errors in the code.

For SSDs,incinerationis considered the most secure method of physical destruction, ensuring no data remanence. SSDs store data differently compared to traditional spinning disks, making degaussing ineffective. Overwriting and formatting may not reliably erase all storage cells due to wear-leveling technologies. Shredding may work if the granularity is extremely fine, but incineration guarantees complete destruction beyond recovery.

The logs show that the user connected fromToronto (104.18.16.29)andLos Angeles (95.67.137.12)within minutes. The sudden location change is a typical trigger forgeoblocking in a Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW), leading to theHR System being denied.

A compromised account (B)would show failed login attempts or unusual activities, but all other access attempts were allowed.

Business hours restriction (C)is unlikely since the user was granted access earlier.

Approved subnet issues (D)would affect all applications, not just HR System access.

The logs indicate multiple failed login attempts for user10, who may have been part of the staff reduction 60 days prior. If user10's account was removed, and their home directory deleted, any applications or services relying on files or configurations within that directory would fail. This scenario is common when service accounts are not properly identified and preserved during staff reductions.

Ensuring that service accounts are documented and maintained separately from user accounts is essential to prevent unintended disruptions to applications and services.

Based on the provided logs, the user has accessed various applications from different geographic locations within a very short timeframe. This pattern is indicative of the "impossible travel" security rule, a common feature in Single Sign-On (SSO) systems designed to detect and prevent fraudulent access attempts.

Analysis of Logs:

At 8:47 p.m., the user accessed a VPN from Toronto.

At 8:48 p.m., the user accessed email from Los Angeles.

At 8:48 p.m., the user accessed the human resources system from Los Angeles.

At 8:49 p.m., the user accessed email again from Los Angeles.

At 8:52 p.m., the user attempted to access the human resources system from Toronto, which was denied.

These rapid changes in location are physically impossible and typically trigger security measures to prevent unauthorized access. The SSO system detected these inconsistencies and likely flagged the activity as suspicious, resulting in access denial.

Understanding the Security Event:

HOST002 is the only device authorized for internet traffic. However, theSIEM logs show that VM002 is making network connections to web.corp.local.

This indicatesunauthorized access, which could bea sign of lateral movement or network infection.

This is ared flagfor potential malware, unauthorized software, or a compromised host.

Why Option D is Correct:

Unusual network traffic patternsare often an indicator of acompromised system.

VM002 should not be communicating externally, but it is.

This suggests a possiblebreach or malware infectionattempting to communicate with a command-and-control (C2) server.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

A (Misconfiguration):While a misconfiguration could explain the unauthorized connections, the pattern of activity suggests something more malicious.

B (Security incident on HOST002):The issue is not with HOST002. The suspicious activity isfrom VM002.

C (False positives):The repeated pattern of unauthorized connections makes false positivesunlikely.

The hijacked administrator account was used across multiple ASNs (indicating different network locations) in a short time, despite MFA and SSO. This suggests a stolen session or token misuse. Let’s analyze:

A. Token theft detection with lockouts:Useful for detecting stolen SSO tokens, but it’s reactive and may not prevent initial misuse across networks.

B. Context-based authentication:This adds real-time checks (e.g., geolocation, IP changes) to verify login attempts. Given the rapid ASN changes, this proactively mitigates the issue by challenging suspicious logins, aligning with CAS-005’s focus on adaptive security.

C. Decentralize accounts:This removes SSO, increasing complexity and weakening MFA enforcement, which isn’t practical or secure.

The technique that best addresses the issue of insider threats from employees who have individual access to encrypted material is key splitting. Here’s why:

Key Splitting: Key splitting involves dividing a cryptographic key into multiple parts anddistributing these parts among different individuals or systems. This ensures that no single individual has complete access to the key, thereby mitigating the risk of insider threats.

Increased Security: By requiring multiple parties to combine their key parts to access encrypted material, key splitting provides an additional layer of security. This approach is particularly useful in environments where sensitive data needs to be protected from unauthorized access by insiders.

Compliance and Best Practices: Key splitting aligns with best practices and regulatory requirements for handling sensitive information, ensuring that access is tightly controlled and monitored.

Managing telemetry and differentiating it by office requires a way to categorize data. Let’s evaluate:

A. Sensor placement:Useful for data collection but doesn’t inherently differentiate by office.

B. Data labeling:Assigns metadata (e.g., office location) to telemetry, enabling differentiation. This aligns with CAS-005’s focus on data management for security operations.

C. Continuous monitoring:Ensures ongoing data collection but doesn’t address differentiation.

The actions described fall under Operational Security (OPSEC), which is the practice of identifying critical information, analyzing potential adversary intelligence collection, and implementing measures to protect sensitive details from disclosure. In this case, the ISAC report highlights how adversaries may use photos shared on social media as reconnaissance, revealing details about technology or configurations inside secure facilities.

By disabling cameras and location services on corporate devices and blocking access to social media from corporate and guest networks, the CISO is reducing the chance of inadvertent information disclosure. This prevents employees from unintentionally leaking images or metadata that adversaries could exploit.

Adversary emulation (A) involves simulating threat actors’ tactics in controlled exercises, which is not what is occurring here. Open-source intelligence (C) is the method adversaries use to gather data, not the defensive practice the CISO is implementing. Social engineering (D) describes manipulative attacks against humans, but this control is preventive, not reactive.

Thus, these measures are clear examples of Operational Security to limit information exposure.

Authenticated scans allow the scanner to verify installed patches and configurations, reducing false positives.

Other options:

A (CMDB updates) improve asset tracking but do not validate patch installations.

C (Advanced fingerprinting) improves accuracy but does not replace authentication.

D (Coordination with teams) is good practice but does not prevent false positives.

The Subject Alternative Name (SAN) field in an X.509 certificate specifies additional hostnames, FQDNs, or IP addresses that the certificate will secure. To allow mutual TLS authentication for multiple hostnames and an IP address, these identities must be included in the SAN field.

Organizational Unit (B) is an informational attribute, not related to TLS authentication.

Extended Key Usage (C) defines purpose (e.g., serverAuth, clientAuth) but not hostnames.

“Certificate extension” (D) is a generic term; SAN is the specific required extension.

The best way for a SOC to rapidly identify whether deployed applications contain specific libraries is through the use of a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM). An SBOM is a formal, machine-readable inventory of all components, including third-party and open-source libraries, used in a software product. When a new vulnerability is disclosed (such as Log4Shell in Log4j), organizations with a comprehensive SBOM can immediately search across their application landscape to determine which systems are impacted.

Other options are less effective. Maintaining SAST/DAST reports (A) only provides snapshots of vulnerabilities at the time of scanning, but does not dynamically track components across all software in production. Vendor attestations (B) improve supply chain governance but do not provide immediate visibility into internal or custom software. A GRC tool (D) helps track vendors and policies but does not show technical dependencies inside applications.

Requiring suppliers and internal developers to provide and maintain SBOMs ensures continuous visibility into dependencies. This allows the SOC to quickly query and respond to emerging vulnerabilities, reducing risk exposure and accelerating remediation timelines.

Based on the provided authentication logs, we observe that User1's accountexperienced multiple failed login attempts within a very short time span (at 8:01:23 AM on 12/15). This pattern indicates a potential brute-force attack or an attempt to gain unauthorized access. Here’s a breakdown of why disabling User1's account is the appropriate first step:

Failed Login Attempts: The logs show that User1 had four consecutive failed login attempts:

VM01 at 8:01:23 AM

VM08 at 8:01:23 AM

VM01 at 8:01:23 AM

VM08 at 8:01:23 AM

Security Protocols and Best Practices: According to CompTIA Security+ guidelines, multiple failed login attempts within a short timeframe should trigger an immediate response to prevent further potential unauthorized access attempts. This typically involves temporarily disabling the account to stop ongoing brute-force attacks.

Account Lockout Policy: Implementing an account lockout policy is a standard practice to thwart brute-force attacks. Disabling User1's account will align with these best practices and prevent further failed attempts, which might lead to successful unauthorized access if not addressed.

The question focuses oninternet-facing hosts, implying external exposure. CVSS scores, remote executability, and exploitavailability guide prioritization. Server2 (205.1.3.5, CVSS 6.5, Bind Server) has a public IP, suggesting it’s internet-facing, unlike Server1 and Server4 (192.168.x.x, private IPs). Server3 (207.1.5.7, CVSS 5.5) is also public but has a lower score and risk compared to Server2’s proof-of-concept (POC) exploit. Server2’s Bind Server (DNS) role is critical and commonly targeted, making it the priority.

Option A:Server1 (CVSS 7.5) is private, not internet-facing.

Option B:Server2 (CVSS 6.5) is internet-facing with an exploit POC, warranting immediate patching.

Option C:Server3 (CVSS 5.5) is internet-facing but less severe.

Option D:Server4 (CVSS 9.8) is critical but private, not internet-facing.